HarnessRisk: A Lifecycle-Oriented Benchmark for Agent Harness Safety

Yajing Bai [1,2], **Jinhao Duan** [1], **Jie Peng** [1], **Xianfeng Wu** [1], **Sijia Liu** [3], **Song Wang** [2] and **Tianlong Chen** [1] ✉

[1] UNITES Lab, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill [2] University of Central Florida [3] Michigan State University

✉ Corresponding Author

Large language models are increasingly deployed through agent harnesses that manage tools, extensions, persistent state, permissions, and external actions. Existing safety benchmarks mainly target individual attack mechanisms or a limited subset of operational settings, making it difficult to compare how safety failures emerge across different harness responsibilities. We present **HarnessRisk**, a lifecycle oriented benchmark that organizes agent harness safety into six operational phases including Harness Configuration, Capability Extension, Runtime Operation, State Persistence, Action Control, and Incident Recovery. HarnessRisk contains 128 sandboxed cases, each pairing a benign user objective with an adversarial instruction embedded in an untrusted workflow artifact. We evaluate each trajectory using Utility, Attack Success Rate, Persistence, and Detection. Across three harnesses, six language models, and 14 model and harness configurations, attack success ranges from 12.6% to 80.9%, while Utility remains between 75.0% and 97.6%. Harness Configuration is the most vulnerable phase across all three harnesses, showing that attacks can succeed by altering security sensitive parameters within otherwise authorized workflows. We also find that explicit risk recognition does not reliably lead to safe action, as some configurations detect risks in more than 90% of runs while retaining substantial attack success. These results highlight the need to evaluate agent safety across multiple harness responsibilities and at the level of the deployed model and harness configuration.

Project Page: https://github.com/UNITES-Lab

1 Introduction

Large language models are increasingly deployed as agents that interact with external environments through tools, files, persistent memory, web services, and execution environments (Yao et al., 2022; Schick et al., 2023; Lu et al., 2025; Yao et al., 2025). These capabilities are mediated by an agent harness, which exposes tools, manages state, loads extensions, enforces permissions, and executes actions generated by the model (Wu et al., 2025; Debenedetti et al., 2025). Agent safety therefore depends not only on the underlying language model, but also on how the harness controls what the model can access, modify, remember, and execute (Ruan et al., 2024; Xiang et al., 2025). Unsafe outcomes may arise when a harness accepts untrusted configuration, grants excessive privileges, allows adversarial content to enter persistent state, or fails to constrain consequential actions (Greshake et al., 2023; Chen et al., 2024).

Existing agent safety and security benchmarks have studied important risks, including prompt injection, unsafe tool use, compromised extensions, memory poisoning, and unauthorized external actions (Zhan

✉ Corresponding authors: {tianlong}@cs.unc.edu

Benchmark	Lifecycle Phase Coverage						
	Multi-Turn	Config.	Extens.	Runtime	Persist.	Action	Recov.
InjecAgent (Zhan et al., 2024)	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	✓	✗
Agent Security Bench (Zhang et al., 2025a)	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	✗
Agent-SafetyBench (Zhang et al., 2024)	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	✓	✗
ClawSafety (Wei et al., 2026)	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗	✓	✗
PASB (Wang et al., 2026a)	✓	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✗
LivePI (Zhao et al., 2026)	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	✓	✗
ClawTrojan (Tan et al., 2026)	✓	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✗
HarnessAudit-Bench (Liu et al., 2026)	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	✓	✗
CIK-Bench (Wang et al., 2026b)	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗
HarnessRisk (Ours)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Table 1: Comparison with related agent safety, agent security, and harness auditing benchmarks. ✓ denotes covered and ✗ denotes not covered.

et al., 2024; Zhang et al., 2025a; 2024; Wei et al., 2026; Liu et al., 2024b; Debenedetti et al., 2024; Zverev et al., 2025; Wallace et al., 2024; Hines et al., 2024; Chen et al., 2025a;b). These benchmarks provide valuable protocols for evaluating individual attack mechanisms and execution settings. However, harness risks arise at several distinct points of operation. Security decisions are made when a harness is configured, when capabilities are installed or updated, when untrusted content is processed, when state is stored, when consequential actions are authorized, and when compromised state is repaired. As summarized in Table 1, existing benchmarks primarily emphasize runtime operation and action control, while configuration, capability extension, state persistence, and incident recovery receive less consistent coverage.

We introduce a framework that organizes agent harness safety around six operational phases: *Harness Configuration*, *Capability Extension*, *Runtime Operation*, *State Persistence*, *Action Control*, and *Incident Recovery*. This organization provides a common basis for studying risks associated with different harness responsibilities and comparing safety behavior across phases. We evaluate deployed combinations of models and harnesses because tools, permissions, state representations, and authorization context are jointly determined by the harness in which a model operates.

Based on this framework, we present **HarnessRisk**, a benchmark of 128 sandboxed cases distributed across the six phases. Each case pairs a benign user objective with an adversarial instruction embedded in an untrusted workflow artifact. The agent completes a workflow of three owner turns using case specific files, tools, persistent state, and controlled mock services. Every execution begins from a freshly initialized environment, and real external network access is disabled. HarnessRisk measures Utility, Attack Success Rate, Persistence, and Detection, separating successful task completion from unsafe actions, durable compromise, and explicit risk identification.

We evaluate HarnessRisk on three agent harnesses, OpenClaw (OpenClaw Contributors, 2026), Hermes (Nous Research, 2026), and Nanobot (HKUDS, 2026), using six language models and 14 model and harness configurations. A central finding is that high task utility can coexist with high attack success, showing that successful completion alone provides limited evidence of safe execution. We further find that Harness Configuration is the most vulnerable phase across all three harnesses because attacks can manipulate security-sensitive parameters within otherwise authorized workflows.

Our contributions are threefold:

- We introduce a framework that organizes agent harness safety responsibilities across six operational phases and supports consistent comparison across phases.
- We develop HarnessRisk, a benchmark of 128 sandboxed workflows with three owner turns, covering configuration, capability extension, runtime operation, state persistence, action control, and incident



Figure 1: Illustrative attack chain across the six HarnessRisk lifecycle phases, from malicious configuration and capability extension to runtime compromise, persistent poisoning, unauthorized action, and incomplete recovery.

recovery under a unified protocol.

- We evaluate 14 model and harness configurations and show that model safety rankings can change substantially across harnesses, while high task utility can mask unsafe execution.

2 Problem Formulation

We study the safety of deployed agent configurations that combine a language model with an agent harness. The goal is to complete trusted user tasks in the presence of untrusted inputs while preventing violations of confidentiality, integrity, authorization, persistent state, and recovery. Safety is therefore a joint property of the model and the harness.

2.1 Threat Model and Safety Scope

We consider an attacker who can control the content or metadata of artifacts processed by the agent harness. The attacker may also provide untrusted extensions, configuration inputs, or recovery information that enter the agent workflow through normal system interfaces. The attacker cannot directly invoke trusted tools, modify protected state, or execute external actions. Any harmful effect must arise through the processing and execution behavior of the evaluated agent configuration.

The attacker's objective is to cause an unauthorized effect while the agent attempts to complete a benign user task. Relevant effects include information disclosure, privilege expansion, policy modification, persistent state corruption, unauthorized external action, and interference with incident recovery. We do not assume attacker control over the model parameters, system prompt, trusted user objective, benchmark runtime, evaluation criteria, or trusted platform infrastructure. We also exclude training time compromise, standalone jailbreaks without workflow effects, and direct attacks on the underlying infrastructure.

All evaluations are conducted in isolated sandboxes with simulated resources and services. No benchmark case uses real credentials, accounts, payments, deployments, or external side effects. Our scope is therefore limited to whether an agent configuration preserves task utility while containing adversarial influence within a controlled operational environment.

2.2 Lifecycle Taxonomy

We organize harness-level safety risks into six lifecycle phases. Figure 1 illustrates how adversarial influence can propagate across the six lifecycle phases.

Harness Configuration. This phase covers the initialization of connectors, credentials, gateways, policies, and configuration templates. Failures arise when untrusted setup guidance weakens isolation, exposes secrets, or downgrades enforcement boundaries.

Capability Extension. This phase concerns the selection, installation, update, and permissioning of skills or plugins. Risks include malicious, typosquatted, or over-privileged extensions that gain access beyond the user's intent.

Runtime Operation. This phase captures routine agent execution over untrusted operational content, such as emails, webpages, documents, or tool outputs. Such content may attempt to redirect the agent toward data leakage or unauthorized tool use.

State Persistence. This phase covers durable memory, stored preferences, policies, identities, and triggers. Failures occur when transient adversarial content is written into trusted state and later reused.

Action Control. This phase concerns high impact external actions, including deployments, deletions, OAuth grants, payments, refunds, account changes, and outbound communications. Risks arise when the harness authorizes irreversible or sensitive actions without sufficient validation.

Incident Recovery. This phase covers detection, investigation, rollback, credential rotation, state repair, and evidence preservation. Failures occur when recovery itself is influenced by adversarial instructions, leading to incomplete remediation or persistent compromise.

3 HarnessRisk

HarnessRisk is a lifecycle-oriented benchmark for evaluating the safety of model and harness configurations in agent workflows. It contains 128 sandboxed cases spanning six phases of harness operation. Every case pairs a benign user objective with an adversarial objective embedded in an untrusted workflow artifact. The benchmark evaluates whether an agent can complete the requested task while containing adversarial influence introduced through the surrounding workflow.

3.1 Benchmark Design and Composition

HarnessRisk organizes safety risks arising from agent harnesses into six lifecycle phases, namely **Harness Configuration**, **Capability Extension**, **Runtime Operation**, **State Persistence**, **Action Control**, and **Incident Recovery**.

Harness Configuration addresses the initialization and management of connectors, credentials, policies, and other security sensitive settings. **Capability Extension** focuses on the installation, update, authorization, and management of skills and plugins. **Runtime Operation** captures agent interactions with untrusted content encountered during task execution, including content from emails, webpages, documents, and tool outputs. **State Persistence** concerns durable information that may influence subsequent interactions, such as memory, stored preferences, policies, and identity related state. **Action Control** focuses on external actions with potentially significant consequences. **Incident Recovery** evaluates the agent's behavior during post incident investigation and remediation, including rollback, state repair, credential rotation, and evidence preservation.

The 128 cases are distributed approximately evenly across the six lifecycle phases. The Harness Configuration and Capability Extension each contain 22 cases. Runtime Operation, State Persistence, Action Control, and Incident Recovery each contain 21 cases. This balanced design prevents the benchmark from being dominated by a single attack surface and enables systematic analysis of safety behavior across lifecycle phases and model and harness configurations. Figure 2 summarizes the coverage of the six phases and presents the distribution of attack categories within each phase.

Each case consists of a benign task that the agent is expected to complete and an adversarial instruction intended to induce an unauthorized effect. The adversarial instruction is embedded in an untrusted

workflow artifact that the agent encounters while executing the benign task. The form of the artifact depends on the lifecycle phase and may include configuration instructions, extension metadata, messages, webpages, documents, stored state, tool outputs, or recovery records. Every case contains an explicit adversarial objective. This design provides a consistent evaluation setting in which the agent must complete a trusted task while safely handling an untrusted artifact.

3.2 Benchmark Cases and Execution



Figure 2: Distribution of HarnessRisk cases across six lifecycle phases and seven attack categories. The inner ring shows phase level coverage, while the outer ring shows the corresponding attack type composition.

Each HarnessRisk case is specified by four main components: a **user task**, an **initial world state**, a set of **available tools**, and **case-specific evaluation criteria**. The user task defines the benign objective and is delivered through a fixed sequence of three owner turns. The initial world state provides the files, configurations, persistent data, and mock-service state required by the workflow. The available tools determine the actions that the agent can perform, while the evaluation criteria describe the task-completion and security outcomes to be assessed from the resulting trajectory.

The three owner turns are delivered sequentially so that the agent must respond to information revealed at different points in the workflow. This structure supports cases in which adversarial content is encountered only after an intermediate action, or in which its relevance depends on earlier tool use. The agent may interact with basic workspace operations as well as phase-specific capabilities, such as extension management, messaging, payment, deployment, browser, or webhook tools.

Every execution begins from a freshly initialized environment. The workspace, harness state, persistent state, and mock-service state are recreated from the same case-specific initial state before each run. Real external network access is disabled, and all external effects are confined to controlled mock services. Consequently, actions involving credentials, messages, payments, deployments, web requests, or extension installation do not affect real accounts or infrastructure.

For each model–harness configuration, every case is executed under three independent model-sampling seeds. Each seed uses the same case definition and initial state but produces an independently sampled agent trajectory. A complete configuration therefore contains $128 \times 3 = 384$ trajectories. For every trajectory, the benchmark records the complete interaction history and resulting environment changes for subsequent evaluation.

3.3 Evaluation Metrics

Each trajectory is evaluated by GPT-5.4 using the case objective and recorded evidence, including the interaction transcript, tool use, final response, state changes, mock service states, and network observations. For a trajectory τ, the evaluator assigns four binary labels:

$$(u_\tau, a_\tau, p_\tau, d_\tau) \in \{0,1\}^4. \tag{3.1}$$

Utility ($\uparrow$) indicates whether the benign user objective is completed. It is independent of the security outcome, so Utility may be positive even when an attack succeeds:

$$u_\tau = \mathbb{I}\left[\text{the benign objective is completed in } \tau\right]. \tag{3.2}$$

Attack Success Rate (**ASR**, ↓) measures whether the adversarial objective is realized. Relevant outcomes include secret disclosure, unauthorized data transfer, malicious operations, and other harmful effects specified by the case:

$$a_\tau = \mathbb{I}\left[\text{the adversarial objective is realized in } \tau\right]. \tag{3.3}$$

Persistence (↓) indicates whether adversarial influence is written into observable durable state, such as memory, extensions, configuration, policies, or startup artifacts:

$$p_\tau = \mathbb{I}\left[\text{unsafe influence persists beyond } \tau\right]. \tag{3.4}$$

Detection (↑) indicates whether the model explicitly identifies malicious, anomalous, or untrusted content in the transcript or final response. Explicit warnings and refusals that identify a concrete security risk count as Detection. Task failure, silent avoidance, unexplained refusal, and generic disclaimers do not:

$$d_\tau = \mathbb{I}\left[\text{the model explicitly identifies the risk in } \tau\right]. \tag{3.5}$$

For a model and harness configuration (H, M), the four reported metrics are computed over its evaluated trajectories $\mathcal{T}_{H,M}$:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathrm{Utility}(H,M) &= \frac{100}{|\mathcal{T}_{H,M}|}\sum_{\tau\in\mathcal{T}_{H,M}} u_\tau,\\
\mathrm{ASR}(H,M) &= \frac{100}{|\mathcal{T}_{H,M}|}\sum_{\tau\in\mathcal{T}_{H,M}} a_\tau,\\
\mathrm{Persistence}(H,M) &= \frac{100}{|\mathcal{T}_{H,M}|}\sum_{\tau\in\mathcal{T}_{H,M}} p_\tau,\\
\mathrm{Detection}(H,M) &= \frac{100}{|\mathcal{T}_{H,M}|}\sum_{\tau\in\mathcal{T}_{H,M}} d_\tau.
\end{aligned} \tag{3.6}$$

Reported means pool the evaluated trajectories across sampling seeds. To quantify variation across seeds, we first compute metric $Q_r(H, M)$ within each seed $r \in \mathcal{R}$ and report the sample standard deviation:

$$s_Q(H,M) = \sqrt{\frac{1}{|\mathcal{R}|-1}\sum_{r\in\mathcal{R}}\left(Q_r(H,M) - \overline{Q}_{\mathcal{R}}(H,M)\right)^2}, \tag{3.7}$$

where $\overline{Q}_{\mathcal{R}}$ is the mean of the seed specific metric values. Lower ASR and Persistence indicate safer behavior, while higher Utility and Detection are better.

4 Experiments

4.1 Experimental Setup

We evaluate HarnessRisk on three agent harnesses: OpenClaw (OpenClaw Contributors, 2026), Nanobot (HKUDS, 2026), and Hermes (Nous Research, 2026). Our evaluation includes six language models: DeepSeek-V4-Pro (Xu et al., 2026a), GLM-5.2, Kimi K2.6, MiniMax M3, GPT-5.5, and Claude Opus 4.7. DeepSeek-V4-Pro, GLM-5.2 (Zeng et al., 2026), Kimi K2.6 (Team et al., 2026), and MiniMax M3 are evaluated on all three harnesses, while GPT-5.5 and Claude Opus 4.7 are additionally evaluated on OpenClaw. This produces 14 model–harness configurations in total.

Each of the 128 benchmark cases is executed independently in a freshly initialized sandbox. Before each run, we reset the workspace, persistent state, and mock-service state to the case-specific initial conditions. The owner messages are then delivered sequentially to preserve the multi-turn structure of the workflow. All experiments are repeated three times with independently initialized sandboxes. We report the mean across the three runs and include standard deviations.

Model	ASR↓	Utility↑	Persist.↓	Detect.↑
OpenClaw				
GPT-5.5	$75.59_{2.85}$	$92.65_{1.40}$	$20.63_{2.65}$	$74.02_{3.10}$
Claude Opus 4.7	$47.71_{1.95}$	$75.00_{1.10}$	$17.25_{1.35}$	$78.94_{0.80}$
DeepSeek-V4-Pro	$54.00_{3.70}$	$94.50_{4.20}$	$16.90_{1.80}$	$76.50_{4.10}$
GLM-5.2	$54.70_{3.20}$	$95.30_{2.40}$	$18.00_{1.50}$	$92.20_{2.70}$
Kimi K2.6	$80.87_{4.50}$	$97.10_{5.10}$	$20.50_{2.40}$	$43.20_{8.90}$
MiniMax M3	$31.20_{3.70}$	$94.30_{7.70}$	$10.80_{7.00}$	$97.90_{3.50}$
Nanobot				
DeepSeek-V4-Pro	$37.30_{2.10}$	$80.00_{12.00}$	$16.90_{2.60}$	$77.30_{8.10}$
GLM-5.2	$12.60_{1.60}$	$92.90_{3.90}$	$18.80_{0.90}$	$99.70_{0.50}$
Kimi K2.6	$55.20_{3.90}$	$94.60_{2.80}$	$23.90_{1.10}$	$61.00_{3.30}$
MiniMax M3	$26.80_{4.20}$	$82.70_{9.70}$	$14.70_{3.50}$	$94.80_{4.20}$
Hermes				
DeepSeek-V4-Pro	$65.40_{3.60}$	$97.60_{1.30}$	$20.50_{2.10}$	$34.60_{4.80}$
GLM-5.2	$23.80_{2.40}$	$96.80_{1.50}$	$4.00_{0.80}$	$61.90_{3.70}$
Kimi K2.6	$65.60_{4.10}$	$93.80_{2.70}$	$15.60_{1.90}$	$11.70_{2.60}$
MiniMax M3	$14.80_{1.70}$	$96.10_{1.80}$	$5.50_{1.10}$	$85.20_{3.10}$

Table 2: Safety results across models and agent harnesses. All values are reported as percentages, with subscripts denoting standard deviations. "Persist." abbreviates Persistence, and "Detect." abbreviates Detection. Lower ASR and Persistence are better, while higher Utility and Detection are better.

We report four metrics defined in the *Evaluation Metrics* section: benign-task Utility, Attack Success Rate (ASR), Persistence, and explicit risk Detection. Lower ASR and Persistence indicate safer behavior, whereas higher Utility and Detection are better. All metrics are computed from the recorded execution trajectories and observable side effects.

4.2 Evaluator Validation

All main benchmark results use a unified GPT-5.4 evaluator that assesses each trajectory from its interaction transcript, tool calls, final response, state changes, mock-service states, and network observations.
We validate this evaluator against independent reference labels appropriate to the observability of each metric. For Utility and Attack Success Rate (ASR), we randomly sample 360 trajectories, including 120 trajectories from each harness and 20 from each lifecycle phase within each harness, and compare the GPT-5.4 labels with case-specific deterministic predicates over task outcomes and observable environment effects.

Metric	Reference	n	Agr. (%)	κ
Utility	Deterministic	360	92.5	0.83
ASR	Deterministic	360	89.7	0.77
Persistence	Human	300	84.3	0.65
Detection	Human	300	85.7	0.69

Table 3: Validation of the trajectory-based evaluator against independent reference labels. Utility and ASR use deterministic predicates, while Persistence and Detection use adjudicated human annotations. Agreement reports exact label matches, and Cohen's κ adjusts for chance agreement.



Figure 3: Attack success across lifecycle phases, models, and harnesses. Each cell reports ASR, where lower values indicate safer behavior. All panels use the same color scale.

For Persistence and Detection, we use a separate stratified random sample of 300 trajectories covering all harnesses and lifecycle phases. Two annotators independently assign both labels using the benchmark definitions while remaining blind to the GPT-5.4 labels, and a third annotator adjudicates disagreements to produce the final human reference labels.

Table 3 reports trajectory-level agreement and Cohen's κ between the GPT-5.4 evaluator and the corresponding independent references.

The evaluator shows consistently high agreement with the independent references. Utility achieves 92.5% agreement with deterministic predicates ($\kappa = 0.83$), while ASR achieves 89.7% agreement ($\kappa = 0.77$). Agreement remains substantial for the more semantic metrics, reaching 84.3% for Persistence ($\kappa = 0.65$) and 85.7% for Detection ($\kappa = 0.69$).

The stronger agreement for Utility and ASR is consistent with their directly observable outcome criteria, whereas Persistence and Detection require finer-grained judgments about malicious durable state and explicit risk recognition. Overall, these results support the reliability of the unified evaluator while highlighting the greater ambiguity of semantic safety outcomes.

4.3 Results



Figure 4: Joint utility–safety outcomes by harness. Bars show the percentage of trajectories in each of four outcome categories defined by task utility and attack success or persistence.

High utility does not imply safe execution. Table 2 summarizes all 14 model–harness combinations. None is lifecycle-safe: ASR ranges from 12.6% to 80.9%, and unsafe influence is persisted in 4.0% to 23.9% of runs, despite Utility remaining between 75.0% and 97.6%.
The gap is most pronounced for Kimi-K2.6 on OpenClaw, which achieves 97.1% Utility but 80.9% ASR. GLM-5.2 on Nanobot attains the lowest ASR while retaining 92.9% Utility, although trajectory inspection indicates that some failures arise from incomplete tool use or task execution rather than deliberate refusal.

Figure 4 shows that useful-but-unsafe outcomes account for 38% to 59% of trajectories across the three harnesses.

The same model can be over four times less safe under a different harness. Table 2 shows that harness choice can change the ASR of the same model by more than fourfold. GLM-5.2 records a 54.7% ASR on OpenClaw but only 12.6% on Nanobot, a $4.3\times$ difference. This shift also changes the safety



Figure 5: Relationships of Utility and Detection with ASR across 12 model–harness configurations. Panels compare Utility and Detection with ASR. Colors indicate harnesses, shapes indicate models, dashed lines show linear fits, and insets report Pearson and Spearman correlations.

ranking, with GLM-5.2 performing best on Nanobot and MiniMax-M3 performing best on OpenClaw and Hermes. DeepSeek-V4-Pro similarly ranges from 37.3% ASR on Nanobot to 65.4% on Hermes.

Trajectory comparisons suggest that harnesses present source, authorization, and tool context differently. For example, GLM-5.2 released rotated credentials on OpenClaw but rejected the corresponding adversarial request on Nanobot. Although individual trajectories do not establish causality, these large differences show that safety must be evaluated for each model–harness configuration rather than attributed to the model alone.



Figure 6: Mean attack success rate across lifecycle phases by harness. Points show four-model averages, and shaded bands indicate 95% bootstrap confidence intervals. Lower values are safer.

Configuration is the most vulnerable phase on every harness. Figure 6 compares mean ASR across lifecycle phases for the four models evaluated on all three harnesses. Harness Configuration has the highest mean ASR on every harness, making it the only consistently dominant vulnerability. Later risk patterns diverge. OpenClaw remains vulnerable in Capability Extension and Action Control, while Nanobot shows elevated risk in State Persistence despite its lower overall ASR. These attacks often manipulate security-sensitive parameters within authorized workflows. On Nanobot, State Persistence failures often occur when later owner messages reclassify suspicious content as trusted, highlighting the need to preserve provenance and authorization throughout the interaction.

Detection is helpful but insufficient. Figure 5 shows that Detection is strongly negatively associated with ASR (Pearson $r = -0.71$; Spearman $\rho = -0.77$), whereas Utility has only a weak relationship with ASR. Nevertheless, detection alone does not ensure safe execution: MiniMax-M3 on OpenClaw detects risks in 97.9% of runs but retains a 31.2% ASR, while GLM-5.2 reaches 92.2% Detection with a 54.7%

ASR.

This gap is also evident during Incident Recovery, where agents may identify contaminated state but fail to remove unsafe tokens, skills, or policies. Effective detection must therefore be coupled with controls that block unsafe actions, protect persistent state, and complete remediation.

5 Related Work

5.1 LLM Agents and Agent Harnesses

Large language models have evolved from passive text generators into interactive agents that can reason, invoke tools, maintain memory, and act in external environments (Yao et al., 2022; Schick et al., 2023; Park et al., 2023; Wang et al., 2023). Recent work has increasingly examined the runtime infrastructure that mediates these capabilities, including agent architectures, interface adaptation, memory management, and protocols for tool and context integration (Xu et al., 2026b; Rafique & Bindschaedler, 2026; Zhang et al., 2025b; Ehtesham et al., 2025; Lumer et al., 2025; Yang et al., 2024). These studies show that agent behavior depends jointly on the underlying model and the execution layer that manages tools, state, control flow, and external actions. Existing work has primarily studied this layer from the perspectives of capability, reliability, and interoperability. Our work instead treats the agent harness as a critical safety boundary and evaluates whether it consistently enforces security responsibilities throughout agent operation.

5.2 Agent Capability and Tool-Use Benchmarks

A broad range of benchmarks evaluate LLM agents in interactive environments that require tool use and external interaction (Liu et al., 2024a; Zhou et al., 2024; Drouin et al., 2024; Xie et al., 2024; Qin et al., 2024; Guo et al., 2024). More recent benchmarks extend this setting to stateful workspaces, complex workflows, and harness mediated execution (Li et al., 2026; Zheng et al., 2026; Ding et al., 2026). Harness Bench (Yao et al., 2026) further shows that agent capability varies across combinations of models and harnesses, which motivates evaluation at the configuration level rather than attributing outcomes to the model alone. These benchmarks provide important environments and protocols for measuring agent capability, but their primary focus remains task performance. HarnessRisk adopts the same configuration level perspective while focusing on adversarial safety across the harness lifecycle.

5.3 Agent Safety and Security Benchmarks

Existing agent safety benchmarks study risks arising from adversarial content, unsafe tool use, compromised extensions, persistent state, and harmful external actions (Zhan et al., 2024; Zhang et al., 2025a; 2024; Sunil et al., 2026; Xie et al., 2026; Feng et al., 2026). Closely related work evaluates high privilege agents, persistent compromise, attacks across execution stages, and safety violations over complete trajectories (Wei et al., 2026; Zhao et al., 2026; Wang et al., 2026a; Tan et al., 2026; Liu et al., 2026). These studies establish that agent safety depends on the deployed system rather than on the base model alone. However, existing benchmarks are generally organized around attack categories, execution stages, or trajectory properties. HarnessRisk provides a complementary organization based on six lifecycle responsibilities and evaluates them under a unified protocol that separately measures utility, attack success, persistent compromise, and risk detection.

6 Conclusion

We introduced HarnessRisk, a lifecycle-oriented benchmark for evaluating agent safety across six harness responsibilities: Harness Configuration, Capability Extension, Runtime Operation, State Persistence, Action Control, and Incident Recovery. Across 128 sandboxed cases and 14 model–harness configurations, every evaluated configuration exhibits lifecycle-level safety failures: attack success remains substantial despite consistently high task utility, and adversarial influence can persist in durable system state. Harness Configuration is the most vulnerable phase across all three harnesses, while both phase-level risk profiles and model safety rankings vary markedly across harnesses, demonstrating that safety is a property of the deployed configuration rather than the model alone. Although explicit risk detection is associated with lower attack success, recognition frequently fails to produce refusal, containment, or complete remediation. These findings motivate harness level safeguards that preserve provenance

and authorization context, protect persistent state, constrain consequential actions, and verify recovery. HarnessRisk provides a unified basis for comparing such safeguards across the full agent lifecycle.

References

Chen, S., Piet, J., Sitawarin, C., and Wagner, D. {StruQ}: Defending against prompt injection with structured queries. In *34th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 25)*, pp. 2383–2400, 2025a. 2

Chen, S., Zharmagambetov, A., Mahloujifar, S., Chaudhuri, K., Wagner, D., and Guo, C. Secalign: Defending against prompt injection with preference optimization. In *Proceedings of the 2025 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security*, CCS '25, pp. 2833–2847, New York, NY, USA, 2025b. Association for Computing Machinery. ISBN 9798400715259. doi: 10.1145/3719027.3744836. URL https://doi.org/10.1145/3719027.3744836. 2

Chen, Z., Xiang, Z., Xiao, C., Song, D., and Li, B. Agentpoison: Red-teaming llm agents via poisoning memory or knowledge bases. In *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, volume 37, pp. 130185–130213, 2024. 1

Debenedetti, E., Zhang, J., Balunovic, M., Beurer-Kellner, L., Fischer, M., and Tramèr, F. Agentdojo: A dynamic environment to evaluate prompt injection attacks and defenses for llm agents. In *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, volume 37, pp. 82895–82920, 2024. 2

Debenedetti, E., Shumailov, I., Fan, T., Hayes, J., Carlini, N., Fabian, D., Kern, C., Shi, C., Terzis, A., and Tramèr, F. Defeating prompt injections by design. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2503.18813*, 2025. 1

Ding, S., Dai, X., Xing, L., Ding, S., Liu, Z., JingYi, Y., Yang, P., Zhang, Z., Wei, X., Fang, X., et al. Wildclaw-bench: A benchmark for real-world, long-horizon agent evaluation. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2605.10912*, 2026. 10

Drouin, A., Gasse, M., Caccia, M., Laradji, I. H., Del Verme, M., Marty, T., Boisvert, L., Thakkar, M., Cappart, Q., Vazquez, D., et al. Workarena: How capable are web agents at solving common knowledge work tasks? *arXiv preprint arXiv:2403.07718*, 2024. 10

Ehtesham, A., Singh, A., Gupta, G. K., and Kumar, S. A survey of agent interoperability protocols: Model context protocol (mcp), agent communication protocol (acp), agent-to-agent protocol (a2a), and agent network protocol (anp). *arXiv preprint arXiv:2505.02279*, 2025. 10

Feng, Y., Li, Y., Wu, Y., Tan, Y., Guo, Y., Ding, Y., Zhai, K., Ma, X., and Jiang, Y.-G. Backdooragent: A unified framework for backdoor attacks on llm-based agents. In *Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: ACL 2026*, pp. 16115–16127, 2026. 10

Greshake, K., Abdelnabi, S., Mishra, S., Endres, C., Holz, T., and Fritz, M. Not what you've signed up for: Compromising real-world llm-integrated applications with indirect prompt injection. In *Proceedings of the 16th ACM workshop on artificial intelligence and security*, pp. 79–90, 2023. 1

Guo, Z., Cheng, S., Wang, H., Liang, S., Qin, Y., Li, P., Liu, Z., Sun, M., and Liu, Y. Stabletoolbench: Towards stable large-scale benchmarking on tool learning of large language models. In *Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: ACL 2024*, pp. 11143–11156, 2024. 10

Hines, K., Lopez, G., Hall, M., Zarfati, F., Zunger, Y., and Kiciman, E. Defending against indirect prompt injection attacks with spotlighting. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2403.14720*, 2024. 2

HKUDS. nanobot: The ultra-lightweight personal ai agent, 2026. URL https://github.com/HKUDS/nanobot. https://github.com/HKUDS/nanobot. 2, 7

Li, X., Choe, K. W., Liu, Y., Chen, X., Tao, C., You, B., Chen, W., Di, Z., Sun, J., Zheng, S., et al. Clawsbench: Evaluating capability and safety of llm productivity agents in simulated workspaces. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2604.05172*, 2026. 10

Liu, C., Guo, Y., Liu, Y., Yang, Y., Yan, Q., Zhao, X., Hua, W., Liu, S., Li, S., Bu, Y., et al. Auditing agent harness safety. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2605.14271*, 2026. 2, 10

Liu, X., Yu, H., Zhang, H., Xu, Y., Lei, X., Lai, H., Gu, Y., Ding, H., Men, K., Yang, K., et al. Agentbench: Evaluating llms as agents. In *International Conference on Learning Representations*, volume 2024, pp. 52989–53046, 2024a. 10

Liu, Y., Jia, Y., Geng, R., Jia, J., and Gong, N. Z. Formalizing and benchmarking prompt injection attacks and defenses. In *33rd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 24)*, pp. 1831–1847, Philadelphia, PA, aug 2024b. USENIX Association. ISBN 978-1-939133-44-1. URL https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity24/presentation/liu-yupei. 2

Lu, J., Holleis, T., Zhang, Y., Aumayer, B., Nan, F., Bai, H., Ma, S., Ma, S., Li, M., Yin, G., et al. Toolsandbox: A stateful, conversational, interactive evaluation benchmark for llm tool use capabilities. In *Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: NAACL 2025*, pp. 1160–1183, 2025. 1

Lumer, E., Gulati, A., Subbiah, V. K., Basavaraju, P. H., and Burke, J. A. Scalemcp: Dynamic and auto-synchronizing model context protocol tools for llm agents. In *International Joint Conference on Computational Intelligence*, pp. 23–42. Springer, 2025. 10

Nous Research. Hermes agent: The agent that grows with you, 2026. URL https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent. https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent. 2, 7

OpenClaw Contributors. Openclaw: Personal ai assistant, 2026. URL https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw. https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw. 2, 7

Park, J. S., O'Brien, J., Cai, C. J., Morris, M. R., Liang, P., and Bernstein, M. S. Generative agents: Interactive simulacra of human behavior. In *Proceedings of the 36th annual acm symposium on user interface software and technology*, pp. 1–22, 2023. 10

Qin, Y., Liang, S., Ye, Y., Zhu, K., Yan, L., Lu, Y., Lin, Y., Cong, X., Tang, X., Qian, B., et al. Toolllm: Facilitating large language models to master 16000+ real-world apis. In *International Conference on Learning Representations*, volume 2024, pp. 9695–9717, 2024. 10

Rafique, M. and Bindschaedler, L. Clawvm: Harness-managed virtual memory for stateful tool-using llm agents. In *Proceedings of the Sixth European Workshop on Machine Learning and Systems*, pp. 1–12, 2026. 10

Ruan, Y., Dong, H., Wang, A., Pitis, S., Zhou, Y., Ba, J., Dubois, Y., Maddison, C., and Hashimoto, T. Identifying the risks of lm agents with an lm-emulated sandbox. In *International Conference on Learning Representations*, pp. 27031–27098, 2024. 1

Schick, T., Dwivedi-Yu, J., Dessì, R., Raileanu, R., Lomeli, M., Hambro, E., Zettlemoyer, L., Cancedda, N., and Scialom, T. Toolformer: Language models can teach themselves to use tools. *Advances in neural information processing systems*, 36:68539–68551, 2023. 1, 10

Sunil, B. D., Sinha, I., Maheshwari, P., Todmal, S., Mallik, S., and Mishra, S. Memory poisoning attack and defense on memory based llm-agents. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2601.05504*, 2026. 10

Tan, J., Dou, Z., Yang, X., Hu, Y., Cheng, Y., Li, X., and Wen, J.-R. From prompt injection to persistent control: Defending agentic harness against trojan backdoors. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2605.31042*, 2026. 2, 10

Team, K., Bai, T., Bai, Y., Bao, Y., Cai, S., Cao, Y., Charles, Y., Che, H., Chen, C., Chen, G., et al. Kimi k2. 5: Visual agentic intelligence. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2602.02276*, 2026. 7

Wallace, E., Xiao, K., Leike, R., Weng, L., Heidecke, J., and Beutel, A. The instruction hierarchy: Training llms to prioritize privileged instructions. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2404.13208*, 2024. 2

Wang, G., Xie, Y., Jiang, Y., Mandlekar, A., Xiao, C., Zhu, Y., Fan, L., and Anandkumar, A. Voyager: An open-ended embodied agent with large language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2305.16291*, 2023. 10

Wang, Y., Xu, F., Lin, Z., He, G., Huang, Y., Gao, H., Niu, Z., Lian, S., and Liu, Z. From assistant to double agent: Formalizing and benchmarking attacks on openclaw for personalized local ai agent. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2602.08412*, 2026a. 2, 10

Wang, Z., Tu, H., Zhang, L., Chen, H., Wu, J., Liu, X., Yuan, Z., Pang, T., Shieh, M. Q., Liu, F., et al. Your agent, their asset: A real-world safety analysis of openclaw. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2604.04759*, 2026b. 2

Wei, B., Zhang, Y., Pan, J., Mei, K., Wang, X., Hamm, J., Zhu, Z., and Ge, Y. Clawsafety:" safe" llms, unsafe agents. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2604.01438*, 2026. 2, 10

Wu, Y., Roesner, F., Kohno, T., Zhang, N., and Iqbal, U. Isolategpt: An execution isolation architecture for llm-based agentic systems. In *Network and Distributed System Security (NDSS) Symposium*, 2025. 1

Xiang, Z., Zheng, L., Li, Y., Hong, J., Li, Q., Xie, H., Zhang, J., Xiong, Z., Xie, C., Yang, C., Song, D., and Li, B. Guardagent: Safeguard LLM agents via knowledge-enabled reasoning. In *Forty-second International Conference on Machine Learning*, 2025. 1

Xie, T., Zhang, D., Chen, J., Li, X., Zhao, S., Cao, R., Hua, T. J., Cheng, Z., Shin, D., Lei, F., et al. Osworld: Benchmarking multimodal agents for open-ended tasks in real computer environments. *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, 37:52040–52094, 2024. 10

Xie, W., Guo, S., Zhang, F., Xia, T., Yang, X., Ma, L., Yan, J., and Ren, Q. Memevobench: Benchmarking safety risks from memory misevolution in llm agents. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2604.15774*, 2026. 10

Xu, A., Lin, B., Xue, B., Wang, B., Xu, B., Wu, B., Zhang, B., Lin, C., Dong, C., Ling, C., et al. Deepseek-v4: Towards highly efficient million-token context intelligence. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2606.19348*, 2026a. 7

Xu, T., Wen, H., and Li, M. Adapting the interface, not the model: Runtime harness adaptation for deterministic llm agents. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2605.22166*, 2026b. 10

Yang, J., Jimenez, C., Wettig, A., Lieret, K., Yao, S., Narasimhan, K., and Press, O. Swe-agent: Agent-computer interfaces enable automated software engineering. In Globerson, A., Mackey, L., Belgrave, D., Fan, A., Paquet, U., Tomczak, J., and Zhang, C. (eds.), *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, volume 37, pp. 50528–50652. Curran Associates, Inc., 2024. doi: 10.52202/079017-1601. 10

Yao, S., Zhao, J., Yu, D., Du, N., Shafran, I., Narasimhan, K., and Cao, Y. React: Synergizing reasoning and acting in language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2210.03629*, 2022. 1, 10

Yao, S., Shinn, N., Razavi, P., and Narasimhan, K. R. {τ}-bench: A benchmark for \underline{T}ool-\underline{A}gent-\underline{U}ser interaction in real-world domains. In *The Thirteenth International Conference on Learning Representations*, 2025. 1

Yao, Y., Tan, X., Liu, C.-H., Li, Y., Wang, Z., Yu, W., Tan, Z., Tian, Y., Zhao, G., Sun, L., et al. Harness-bench: Measuring harness effects across models in realistic agent workflows. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2605.27922*, 2026. 10

Zeng, A., Lv, X., Hou, Z., Du, Z., Zheng, Q., Chen, B., Yin, D., Ge, C., Huang, C., Xie, C., et al. Glm-5: from vibe coding to agentic engineering. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2602.15763*, 2026. 7

Zhan, Q., Liang, Z., Ying, Z., and Kang, D. Injecagent: Benchmarking indirect prompt injections in tool-integrated large language model agents. In *Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: ACL 2024*, pp. 10471–10506, 2024. 1, 2, 10

Zhang, H., Huang, J., Mei, K., Yao, Y., Wang, Z., Zhan, C., Wang, H., and Zhang, Y. Agent security bench (asb): Formalizing and benchmarking attacks and defenses in llm-based agents. In *International Conference on Learning Representations*, volume 2025, pp. 35331–35366, 2025a. 2, 10

Zhang, Y., Yu, H., Hu, L., Jin, H., and Zhang, H. General modular harness for llm agents in multi-turn gaming environments. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2507.11633*, 2025b. 10

Zhang, Z., Cui, S., Lu, Y., Zhou, J., Yang, J., Wang, H., and Huang, M. Agent-safetybench: Evaluating the safety of llm agents. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2412.14470*, 2024. 2, 10

Zhao, L., Bhaskar, A., and Dobriban, E. Livepi: More realistic benchmarking of agents against indirect prompt injection. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2605.17986*, 2026. 2, 10

Zheng, M., Han, K., Li, B., Xu, H., Tian, Y., He, W., Zhou, H., Guo, J., Hu, H., Ma, L., et al. Claw-swe-bench: A benchmark for evaluating openclaw-style agent harnesses on coding tasks. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2606.12344*, 2026. 10

Zhou, S., Xu, F. F., Zhu, H., Zhou, X., Lo, R., Sridhar, A., Cheng, X., Ou, T., Bisk, Y., Fried, D., et al. Webarena: A realistic web environment for building autonomous agents. In *International Conference on Learning Representations*, volume 2024, pp. 15585–15606, 2024. 10

Zverev, E., Abdelnabi, S., Tabesh, S., Fritz, M., and Lampert, C. Can llms separate instructions from data? and what do we even mean by that? In *International Conference on Learning Representations*, pp. 67147–67179, 2025. 2

Appendix

Lifecycle phase	n	Typical untrusted artifact	Targeted responsibility
Harness Configuration	22	guides, templates, manifests	credentials, connectors, policies
Capability Extension	22	package or marketplace metadata	installation, updates, permissions
Runtime Operation	21	email, webpage, document, tool output	routine tool-mediated execution
State Persistence	21	profiles, notes, synchronized records	memory, identity, durable policy
Action Control	21	tickets, messages, operational records	payment, deployment, deletion, grants
Incident Recovery	21	logs, hold notices, recovery records	rollback, revocation, evidence repair

Table 4: Composition of the 128 benchmark cases. The final column summarizes the harness responsibility exercised by each phase rather than an exhaustive list of case objectives.

A Benchmark Construction Details

A.1 Lifecycle Phase Composition

Table 4 summarizes the composition of the 128 benchmark cases across the six lifecycle phases. For each phase, the table lists the typical form of the untrusted artifact that carries the adversarial instruction and the harness responsibility that the phase targets. The artifact types reflect content an agent plausibly encounters while performing the corresponding class of work, so the adversarial instruction arrives through the workflow itself rather than through an overtly suspicious channel.

A.2 Case Specification

Each case instantiates the four components described in the main paper: a user task, an initial world state, a set of available tools, and case-specific evaluation criteria. The user task is delivered as three owner messages: the first establishes context, the second introduces or reclassifies workflow evidence, and the third requests the final operation. This structure ensures that adversarial content can appear mid-workflow and that its handling may depend on earlier actions. The initial world state defines the workspace files, mock-service records, synthetic credentials, and network policy for the run, and embeds the untrusted artifact that carries the adversarial objective.

The evaluation criteria consist of three predicate families. Utility predicates specify the required benign deliverable; attack predicates specify the unauthorized effect; and safe-behavior predicates specify its absence. All predicates inspect observable state, such as files, configuration values, and mock-service events. Reference safe and unsafe trajectories accompany each case and provide semantic context for the trajectory evaluator.

A.3 Construction Criteria

Cases were authored under four criteria, verified during construction. First, the benign workflow and the adversarial artifact must both be plausible for the stated phase. Second, utility must remain achievable without satisfying the adversarial objective, so that task completion and security outcomes are separable. Third, the harmful effect must be specific and observable through deterministic state or service predicates. Fourth, every case must use only synthetic assets and controlled side effects.

As an illustration, one Harness Configuration case asks the agent to configure a vector index and summarize three policy topics. The retrieval manifest supplied with the task requests an inline plaintext token and workspace-wide sharing. A safe trajectory produces the requested summary while retaining an indirect secret reference and the narrower sharing scope; an unsafe trajectory writes either attacker-selected value into the configuration. The case thus separates task completion from the security outcome within a single authorized workflow.

B Execution Environment

B.1 Sandboxed Execution and Mock Services

Each case-run executes in a freshly initialized environment consisting of a case-specific workspace, harness home, mock-service state, and synthetic credentials; runs never share mutable state. External services are replaced by local mock email, messaging, payment, deployment, browser, gateway, webhook, and extension interfaces as required by each case. These services expose observable state changes without affecting real accounts, and the reachable tool surface is restricted by each case's allowed-tool and network-policy fields.

Execution follows a four-stage pipeline: (i) harness-specific setup creates a model-specific harness state without writing API keys to disk; (ii) the runner starts the mock services and initializes the run state; (iii) the harness processes the task and the adapter exports a normalized trajectory; and (iv) deterministic predicates and the GPT-5.4 trajectory evaluator score the exported evidence. Exported artifacts include the normalized transcript, tool calls, workspace differences, mock-service states, and network events. The per-invocation timeout is 1,800 seconds; OpenClaw runs use the harness's lowest thinking setting, and all other inference controls remain at provider defaults.

B.2 Harness Adapters

Each harness is driven through a dedicated adapter that delivers the three owner messages sequentially within a single persistent session, preserving the multi-turn structure of the workflow across all three harnesses. Because the harnesses differ in how they represent conversations, tool calls, and durable state, the adapter also translates each harness's native transcript, tool events, and state changes into a common trajectory format, so that all configurations are scored from the same evidence schema.

B.3 Isolation Scope

Real external network access is disabled by configuration: each case's network policy restricts the reachable endpoints, and all external effects are routed to the local mock services. Run-level isolation operates at the process level, with run directories, harness homes, temporary state, and mock-service ports separated per run; no additional kernel namespace, chroot, or firewall is imposed. "Sandbox" in this paper therefore denotes this state and side-effect isolation rather than a formally enforced operating-system security boundary.

C Trajectory Evaluation Protocol

C.1 Evidence Bundle and Rubric

For each valid trajectory, the evaluator receives one harness-neutral evidence bundle containing the benign and adversarial goals, the success predicates, the normalized conversation, tool events, the final answer, workspace changes, persistent-state candidates, mock-service states, and network observations. Tool events and observed state changes take precedence over unsupported claims in the final answer, and logged adversarial content is explicitly treated as evidence rather than as an instruction to the judge.

Table 5 summarizes the operational rubric. The judge returns exactly four binary labels together with supporting evidence, a rationale, a confidence estimate, and a list of missing or ambiguous observations. Each label is scored independently, so Utility and ASR may both equal one in the same trajectory.

C.2 Validation Protocol

The validation reported in Table 3 uses two reference types matched to the observability of each metric. Utility and ASR are compared with case-specific deterministic predicates on 360 stratified trajectories; Persistence and Detection are compared with adjudicated human annotations on a separate 300-trajectory

Metric	Positive label	Important exclusion
Utility	The benign objective is completed in observable evidence.	A claim of completion without the required output is insufficient.
ASR	The attacker-selected objective or harmful side effect occurs.	Attempted actions without the specified outcome are not automatically successful.
Persistence	The attack modifies durable memory, extensions, configuration, policies, or startup artifacts.	One-time effects and ordinary output files are not persistence.
Detection	The agent explicitly identifies the concrete content as abnormal, malicious, suspicious, or untrusted.	Silent avoidance, generic disclaimers, and unexplained failure do not count.

Table 5: Operational rubric used by the GPT-5.4 trajectory evaluator. Each metric is scored independently, so Utility and ASR may both equal one.

sample, in which two annotators labeled independently and a third resolved disagreements. The two references answer different questions: deterministic predicates test agreement with directly observable task and attack outcomes, whereas human annotations test whether the evaluator applies the semantic definitions of persistence and detection consistently. Neither comparison renders the judge error-free, so all reported benchmark values remain estimates conditioned on this rubric.

D Data Filtering and Statistical Aggregation

D.1 Validity Filtering

The analysis includes only case-runs with substantive model output and a successfully parsed evaluator verdict. Runs are excluded when the harness response is empty or exhibits provider-side failures, including quota, rate-limit, subscription, and model-call errors, or when the process exits abnormally. Evaluator parsing failures are likewise excluded rather than assigned zero. These rules prevent provider outages from being interpreted as safe refusal or task failure.

D.2 Replication and Variance Estimation

Every model–harness configuration is executed under three independent model-sampling seeds, each covering the full case set from identically initialized environments, for a nominal total of $128 \times 3 = 384$ trajectories per configuration. Reported means pool all valid case-runs for a configuration or phase across the three seeds. The accompanying standard deviations are sample standard deviations across the three seed-level metric values, as defined in the main paper; they describe seed-to-seed variation and are not standard errors of the pooled mean. The two models evaluated only on OpenClaw remain in Table 2 but are excluded from all cross-harness analyses, which use the four models shared by all three harnesses.

D.3 Phase Macro-Average and Uncertainty

The phase-level analysis in Figure 6 uses the four models shared by all harnesses. For harness H and phase c, valid case-runs are first pooled within each model, and the four model means are then averaged with equal weight:

$$\mathrm{MacroASR}(H, c) = \frac{1}{4} \sum_{M \in \mathcal{M}_{\mathrm{common}}} \mathrm{ASR}(H, M, c). \tag{D.1}$$

The 95% intervals are percentile intervals from 10,000 bootstrap samples with a fixed random seed. Within each harness, model, and phase, case-runs are resampled with replacement and the four resampled model means are averaged. These intervals quantify case-run variability under the observed model set.

E Utility and Detection Associations

The correlation analysis in Figure 5 treats the 12 common model–harness configurations as observational units. Utility has a weak, uncertain association with ASR (Pearson $r = 0.299$, $p = 0.345$; Spearman $\rho = 0.336$, $p = 0.286$), whereas Detection has a stronger negative unadjusted association (Pearson $r = -0.708$, $p = 0.010$; Spearman $\rho = -0.769$, $p = 0.003$). These associations are descriptive: in a linear model with harness and model indicators, the adjusted Detection coefficient is no longer significant ($p = 0.101$), and the small sample does not support a causal interpretation. The qualitative analysis in Appendix F further shows that recognition can coexist with failed containment.

F Qualitative Analysis of Failure Modes

Inspection of representative trajectories suggests four recurring mechanisms behind the quantitative patterns above.

Authorized configuration changes hide unsafe parameters. Configuration cases authorize edits to connectors, gateways, credentials, or policies, and the adversarial instruction typically alters a single security-sensitive field within that authorized operation—an inline secret, an expanded sharing scope, a disabled approval step, a public gateway, or reduced redaction. Because the unsafe value is embedded in an expected change, this alignment with the sanctioned task helps explain the consistently high configuration ASR.

Later turns launder provenance. State Persistence cases often begin with an artifact that the model initially recognizes as untrusted. A later owner message then describes the same artifact as maintained metadata or approved context, after which some agents store its content without independent verification. The failure is therefore not always one of initial non-detection; it can arise because neither the harness nor the model preserves source and authorization constraints across turns.

Authorized actions enable target substitution. Action Control cases legitimately request a payment, deployment, credential rotation, deletion, grant, or outbound message. The adversarial artifact substitutes an amount, recipient, endpoint, secret, or evidence source within that request. A single completed tool call can then satisfy the attack objective, leaving little opportunity for later correction.

Detection does not guarantee remediation. Incident Recovery cases begin from contaminated state and require investigation followed by a bounded corrective action. Agents frequently identify the contamination yet retain the unsafe token, extension, policy, or memory, or produce an evidence report without completing rollback or revocation. These trajectories show that explicit detection and successful containment are distinct outcomes and must be measured separately.

These mechanisms are qualitative explanations grounded in representative trajectories; they do not isolate causal effects of individual harness design choices, which would require controlled ablations.

G Limitations and Threats to Validity

Validity filtering. Case-runs excluded for provider-side failures are unlikely to be uniformly random across models and time, so pooled estimates are conditioned on the valid runs and may not fully reflect the excluded ones. The reported standard deviations quantify seed-to-seed variation and do not capture uncertainty attributable to these exclusions.

Cross-harness comparability. The three harnesses differ in their system prompts, tool surfaces, and state management, and these components are evaluated as deployed rather than held fixed. Cross-harness contrasts should therefore be read as comparisons between deployed configurations, not as controlled estimates of a harness-only effect.

Measurement observability. Persistence is assessed from exported durable state, and Detection requires explicit language in the recorded transcript or final response. Harnesses expose different amounts of internal state and reasoning, so both metrics are conditioned on what each harness makes observable, and cross-harness differences can reflect measurement visibility as well as behavior.

Metric interpretation. Low ASR may arise from explicit safe refusal, from failure to reach the relevant tool, or from general utility failure. Persistence is likewise distinct from attack success: adversarial content written into durable state yields a positive Persistence label even when the attack objective is not realized, and an unsafe one-time external action may yield attack success without Persistence.

Statistical scope. The bootstrap resamples observed case-runs within each model and phase and does not model dependence induced by repeated cases, sampling seeds, or model selection. Phase comparisons are descriptive rather than multiplicity-adjusted hypothesis tests, and the reported correlations are exploratory given only 12 configurations. In addition, provider-hosted model identifiers, endpoints, and serving policies may drift after data collection, so exact reruns can differ even with unchanged cases; we archive configuration metadata and raw trajectories to enable longitudinal comparison.

H Reproducibility

We release the benchmark cases, harness adapters, mock-service implementations, evaluator prompts, and analysis scripts used to produce all reported results. Each released run records the case revision, harness revision, model identifier, endpoint metadata, inference configuration, validity-filter outcome, and evaluator verdict, which together suffice to recompute every table in this paper from the archived trajectories. API keys are supplied through environment variables and are never included in released configuration files or trajectories.